

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY

INFORMATION

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September 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

MORI C05106265

JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

SUBJECT:

COSVN Offensive Instruction

[redacted] has given us the latest COSVN instructions for the continued offensive which are reportedly based on a mid-August Hanoi Party Central Committee appraisal of the South Vietnam situation (Tab A). According to this appraisal, October will be the decisive month of the offensive during which increased Communist military pressure will force President Nixon to make concessions leading to a settlement and cease-fire. The following are the main points of the Central Committee appraisal and the implementing COSVN instruction:

-- "There will be an October highpoint led by the main forces which will force President Nixon to adopt a clearcut position of ending the war and making concessions so as to reach a settlement and cease-fire or face the prospect of losing the elections."

-- "The Central Committee, foreseeing the difficulties which might confront us after the 1972 U. S. presidential election period, did not launch the offensive and uprising in 1971 nor postpone it until 1973..."

-- "The U. S. will have to accept a political settlement sooner or later because the issue of U. S. prisoners will remain when the U. S. election period has passed. The U. S. knows that unless it reaches an agreement... the prisoners will not be released." Therefore, it is important to capture as many prisoners as possible. (The cadre conducting the briefing on which this report is based warned that it demoralized troops to speculate on whether or not President Nixon will refuse to make concessions because he feels sure of re-election and on whether he will harden or soften U. S. policy if re-elected.)

-- "The Central Committee has found through secret talks that the U. S. - puppet attitude is softer than before."

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-- There are to be concentrated attacks on the pacification program, and the "liberated" areas are to be expanded, particularly those in the Mekong Delta. In September there are to be heavy artillery and sapper attacks against the Saigon Capital Zone defense line, district seats in various locales, and major U.S. and GVN military installations. Local forces are to expand control in the countryside and "eliminate" GVN personnel.

-- In preparation for a cease-fire, there must be intense political preparations, especially those aimed at penetrating and ultimately controlling GVN organizations. When a political settlement comes, Party members must be everywhere and able to control one third of the population "if we are to defeat the enemies by political means." COSVN has estimated that "we now have only one Party member for every 3,000 civilians." (It is not clear whether this is an overall figure or refers to a specific area.) "If this ratio remains unchanged, we will be unable to influence political developments during the cease-fire and International Control Commission period."

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-- "The morale and determination of our Party members and cadres are lower than those of the enemies. We, for fear of being killed, are unwilling to seize greater victories. The enemies, although beaten, are determined to rally their forces for a counteroffensive to recover the areas they have lost."

Comment:

that the next offensive highpoint would come in October. This seems to show some slippage in the enemy timetable as previous reports indicated that COSVN selected August-September as the "decisive" period. Most likely the enemy is having difficulty mustering the necessary manpower and supplies for the next push. It is also possible that Hanoi has decided that military pressure would have a greater political payoff if it is closer to our elections.

The emphasis on attacks around Saigon helps confirm our belief that the major Communist military objective is to isolate Saigon by controlling the main routes to the city and the surrounding countryside. ARVN units would be tied down in coping with main force attacks while local forces and guerrillas filtered past the main battle areas and expanded Communist control over the countryside around Saigon. The Communists calculate that isolating Saigon would give them tremendous political leverage in a cease-fire situation.

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
They no doubt also want to isolate Hue, Danang, Qui Nhon and other major cities prior to a cease-fire. Such encirclement is probably more important to the enemy at this point than expending manpower in a costly effort to capture cities. Concomitant with this will be an increased effort to gain control of the populated (or once populated) areas in the countryside.

It is interesting to note the other side's concern about the possibility of the President being re-elected without his having made the necessary concessions leading to a settlement. Here the Central Committee feels compelled to make it clear that all will not be lost in this eventuality and that we must sooner or later come to terms to get our prisoners back. The distinct possibility (in Hanoi's view) of the President's re-election must be causing considerable problems at all levels on the other side. The briefing cadre's side remark on the impact of this on troop morale is significant. The continuation of private talks has no doubt also caused problems among the rank and file, and the Central Committee has felt it necessary to justify their continuation on the putative grounds that our position is getting softer. On the other hand, the Central Committee warns cadres and troops that if they do not do their part "the negotiations will falter."

Instructions, such as these issued by the Central Committee and COSVN, almost always exhort cadres and troops to do better by pointing out both their strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, these latest instructions reflect a real concern in Hanoi that the Communist apparatus in the South might not be ready for the political struggle when a settlement and cease-fire is reached. The Communists probably believe that even with a political settlement on their terms, the political struggle will be difficult and complicated and will involve a great deal of foul play on both sides. They realize that the imposition of a coalition government does not, of itself, eliminate strong organized political opposition or armed forces hostile to the Communists. For this reason, the Communists believe it would be extremely dangerous politically to have a cease-fire without a coalition, and even with this political advantage, a commanding military position on the ground is essential. It is against this backdrop that the above Hanoi instructions must be read.

Incidentally, the reference to the "cease-fire and International Control Commission period" strongly suggests -- as one might expect -- that Hanoi will insist that the ICC as now constituted police any cease-fire agreed upon. In this connection, Hanoi media reported that ICC delegates attended a September 1 National Day function in Hanoi. This is the first time in years that ICC presence at such a function has been publicly mentioned.

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CITE TDCS 314/06832-72

DIST 3 SEPTEMBER 1972

By: Asst. I.C. Date: 9/2/42

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT COSVN INTENTIONS TO LAUNCH A MAIN FORCE HIGHPOINT
IN OCTOBER 1972 AND ITS INSTRUCTIONS FOR MILITARY
AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES DURING SEPTEMBER 25X1

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SUMMARY: THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) HAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBORDINATE PARTY COMMITTEES AND MILITARY FORCES OUTLINING VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (VC/NVA) OBJECTIVES FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER THROUGH OCTOBER 1972. THE INSTRUCTIONS IDENTIFY OCTOBER AS THE DECISIVE MONTH OF THE 1972 OFFENSIVE, THE MONTH DURING WHICH MAIN FORCES WILL LEAD A CONCERTED HIGHPOINT DESIGNED TO FORCE U.S.-GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) POLICY CONCESSIONS AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE PRIOR TO THE U.S. NOVEMBER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND TO MOVE THE REVOLUTION INTO A NEW POLITICAL STAGE BY THE END OF 1972. THE COSVN INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH ARE BASED ON A MID-AUGUST CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE APPRAISAL OF THE OFFENSIVE AND ARE DIVIDED INTO THREE SECTIONS, CONTAIN A SUMMARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE EVALUATION OF THE VC AND U.S.-GVN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. THE SUMMARY SECTION HIGHLIGHTS THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE STATEMENT THAT "FOR NEGOTIATING PURPOSES AT THIS TIME IT IS MORE DESIRABLE TO CAPTURE ONE U.S. SOLDIER OR CIVILIAN THAN TO KILL 30 OTHERS" AND INSTRUCTS CADRES AND TROOPS TO GUARD ALL U.S. PRISONERS CLOSELY TO PREVENT THEIR ESCAPE OR DEATH, SINCE IT IS THE PRISONER ISSUE WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY FORCE THE U.S. TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE WAR. THE SECOND

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SECTION OF INSTRUCTIONS DEFINES SPECIFIC MILITARY TASKS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY MAIN AND LOCAL FORCES DURING SEPTEMBER AS PART OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE OCTOBER HIGHPOINT. THE ARTILLERY AND SAPPER ARMS OF VC/NVA MAIN FORCES ARE DIRECTED TO ATTACK SAIGON CAPITAL ZONE DEFENSE LINES AND MAJOR GVN AND U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, PRIMARILY TO DIVERT GVN FORCES FROM LAUNCHING COUNTER-OFFENSIVES TO RECOVER LIBERATED TERRITORIES. THE MAJOR TASK FOR LOCAL FORCES IN SEPTEMBER IS THE ASSASSINATION OF GVN HAMLET OFFICIALS AND LOCAL MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL, IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT GVN ADMINISTRATIVE COLLAPSE AT THE BASIC GOVERNMENT LEVEL. THE THIRD SECTION OUTLINES IN GENERAL TERMS FAMILIAR VC PROSELYTING AND POLITICAL TASKS WHICH, IF ACCOMPLISHED DURING SEPTEMBER, WOULD SERVE AS A FOUNDATION FOR VC ACTIVITIES DURING THE CEASEFIRE AND AN INTERIM "CONTROL COMMISSION" PERIOD AND WOULD ALLOW VC PREPARATIONS TO ASSUME CONTROL OVER A FUTURE "COALITION GOVERNMENT". END SUMMARY.

1. AT A LATE AUGUST 1972 VC PARTY COMMITTEE CONFERENCE, COSVN CADRES PRESENTED A CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE APPRAISAL OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM SITUATION AS OF MID-AUGUST. THE APPRAISAL INCLUDED

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AN EVALUATION OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S DETERMINATION TO BRING THE REVOLUTION TO THE POLITICAL STAGE PRIOR TO THE END OF 1972 AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A HIGHPOINT, TO BE LED BY MAIN FORCE UNITS, DURING OCTOBER. THE CADRES OUTLINED VC/NVA MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES FOR SEPTEMBER IN PREPARATION FOR THE OCTOBER HIGHPOINT AND ISSUED COSVN INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBORDINATE CADRES AND TROOPS ON THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. AS REMEMBERED BY A PROVINCE LEVEL CADRE WHO ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE, THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE APPRAISAL AND THE COSVN INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. "THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE SITUATION APPRAISAL.

(1) "WE ARE FACED WITH A FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY AND CAN DEFEAT U.S. PRESIDENT RICHARD M. N I X O N'S DOCTRINE OF VIETNAMIZATION AND THE "PUPPET" (GVN) PACIFICATION PROGRAM. WE CAN REALIZE THE (CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE) DECISION TO FORCE THE U.S. TO ACKNOWLEDGE DEFEAT AND ACCEPT THE SEVEN-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WE CAN BRING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION TO A NEW POLITICAL STAGE BY THE END OF 1972. WHILE WE MAY MEET WITH SOME DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE ENEMIES (U.S. AND GVN) IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH

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VIETNAM, WE ARE DETERMINED TO OVERCOME THEM AND WIN THE GREATEST POSSIBLE VICTORIES IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME. OCTOBER WILL BE THE DECISIVE MONTH OF THE 1972 OFFENSIVE. THERE WILL BE AN OCTOBER HIGHPOINT LED BY THE MAIN FORCES WHICH WILL FORCE PRESIDENT NIXON TO ADOPT A CLEARCUT POSITION OF ENDING THE WAR AND MAKING CONCESSIONS TO US SO AS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT AND CEASE-FIRE OR FACE THE PROSPECT OF LOSING THE NOVEMBER U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. COSVN IS MAKING SUBORDINATE PARTY COMMITTEES AWARE OF THE DETERMINATION OF THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE TO BRING THE REVOLUTION INTO A POLITICAL STAGE BY THE END OF 1972. THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE CALLS UPON EVERY PARTY MEMBER TO MAKE HIS GREATEST EFFORT TO CARRY OUT THIS DECISION AND TO BE WILLING TO DIE FOR THE PARTY. PROCRASTINATION, COWARDICE, AND FEAR ARE CRIMES AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND THE PARTY. THE ENTIRE PARTY MUST BE DETERMINED TO DEFEAT VIETNAMIZATION, DESTROY PACIFICATION, AND PROVE THAT THE ENEMIES ARE LOSING TO THE REVOLUTION, AND TO DO THIS PRIOR TO THE NOVEMBER U.S. ELECTIONS SO THAT PRESIDENT NIXON WILL BE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN PRESENT U.S. POLICY."

COMMENT:

THE PROVINCE CADRE INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT THAT COSVN HAS MADE SELECT COMMITTEES AWARE OF THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE PARTY

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APPRAISAL IN ORDER TO STOP LOWER LEVEL DISCUSSIONS, SOME OF WHICH APPARENTLY REACH THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WAR WILL CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. ACCORDING TO COSVN, THERE IS TOO MUCH CONCERN EXPRESSED BY LEVELS NEITHER ABLE TO UNDERSTAND NOR TO INFLUENCE THE TREND OF THE REVOLUTION. LOWER ECHELONS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS QUESTIONS SUCH AS WHETHER OR NOT NIXON WILL REFUSE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS BECAUSE HE BELIEVES HE WILL WIN THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, OR WHETHER IF NIXON IS REELECTED, U.S. POLICY WILL BE HARDENED OR WILL BE MODIFIED TO CONCEDE POINTS. DISCUSSION OF SUCH POINTS SERVES ONLY TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE TASKS AT HAND AND TO DEMORALIZE LOWER LEVEL CADRES AND TROOPS. CADRES HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE ENEMY IS LOSING TO THE REVOLUTION IN EVERY WAY AND TO DO THIS PRIOR TO THE U.S. NOVEMBER ELECTIONS.)

(2) "THE PUPPETS ARE AWARE OF THEIR PRECARIOUS SITUATION AND OUR DETERMINATION; THEREFORE, PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU'S REGIME IS TRYING TO RECOVER THE AREAS LIBERATED SINCE APRIL, SUCH AS QUANG TRI AND BINH DINH PROVINCES. EVEN THOUGH THE PUPPETS HAVE NOT RECOVERED THESE AREAS AND ARE SUFFERING GREAT LOSSES IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, THEY KEEP TRYING TO COUNTERATTACK. THEY CONTINUE TO CONSCRIPT MEN, IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THEIR

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TROOPS, AND COLLECT MONEY FROM THE POPULACE TO CARRY OUT THESE OBJECTIVES SO AS TO PROVE THAT THEIR VIETNAMIZATION AND PACIFICATION PROGRAMS CANNOT FAIL. THEY ARE MAKING MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO RECOVER THEIR STRENGTH, TO COUNTERATTACK, AND TO SEE THAT THE PRESENT U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH VIETNAM IS MAINTAINED. IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE AND COSVN, THE MORALE AND DETERMINATION OF OUR PARTY MEMBERS AND CADRES ARE LOWER THAN THOSE OF THE ENEMIES. WE, FOR FEAR OF BEING KILLED, ARE UNWILLING TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE GREATER VICTORIES. THE ENEMIES, ALTHOUGH BEATEN, ARE DETERMINED TO RALLY THEIR FORCES FOR A COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO RECOVER THE AREAS THEY HAVE LOST." [REDACTED] THIS WOULD SEEM TO CONTRADICT THE OPENING STATEMENT THAT THE VC ARE FACED WITH A FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY.) [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE COSVN COMRADES EXPLAINED THAT DURING THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE OFFENSIVE THE VC/NVA SACRIFICED MANY OF THEIR MEN TO PENETRATE ENEMY DEFENSE LINES OF CONCRETE. NOW, WHILE THE ENEMY IS ATTEMPTING TO BUILD NEW DEFENSES WITH NOTHING BUT MUD AND CLAY, THE VC ARE NOT EVEN TRYING TO DESTROY THEM BUT ARE RATHER GIVING THE ENEMY TIME TO BUILD NEW DEFENSE LINES AS BIG AND STRONG AS THE OLD ONES, AND THE ENEMY IS TAKING THE ADVANTAGE THUS OFFERED. IF THE VC DO NOT ATTACK CONTINUALLY

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THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM, THE ENEMY WILL HAVE CONSCRIPTED NEW MEN, TRAINED THEM, PROVIDED THEM WITH NEW WEAPONS, AND REBUILT HIS DEFENSE LINES - ALL OF WHICH WILL DOUBLE THE DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING THE VC AND THE TIME IT WILL TAKE TO MAKE THE REVOLUTION A SUCCESS.)

(3) "THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE, FORESEEING THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH MIGHT CONFRONT US AFTER THE 1972 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PERIOD, DID NOT LAUNCH THE OFFENSIVE IN 1971 NOR POSTPONE IT UNTIL 1973. IT CHOSE TO LAUNCH THE OFFENSIVE AND UPRISING IN 1972 TO PROVE ITS DETERMINATION TO BRING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION TO A NEW STAGE, THE STAGE OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE. THE PARTY'S RESOLUTION REMAINS UNCHANGED. WE MUST IMPLEMENT ITS POLICIES AND CARRY OUT ITS MISSIONS. THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE HAS POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SOONER OR LATER BECAUSE THE ISSUE OF U.S. PRISONERS WILL REMAIN WHEN THE U.S. ELECTION PERIOD HAS PASSED. THE U.S. KNOWS THAT UNLESS IT REACHES AN AGREEMENT WITH THE VC/NVA THE PRISONERS WILL NOT BE RELEASED. THEREFORE, THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE INSTRUCTS ALL VC/NVA TROOPS AND CADRES THAT AT THIS TIME (PRIOR TO THE NOVEMBER U.S. ELECTIONS) IT IS MORE DESIR-

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ABLE TO CAPTURE ONE AMERICAN ALIVE THAN TO KILL 30 OTHERS. AFTER A U.S. SOLDIER OR CIVILIAN IS CAPTURED HE MUST BE GUARDED CLOSELY TO PREVENT HIS ESCAPE OR DEATH." [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE PROVINCE 25X1 CADRE COMMENTED THAT, ACCORDING TO THE COSVN CADRES, IF THERE HAD BEEN NO U.S. PRISONERS IN VC/NVA HANDS, THE U.S. WOULD NEVER HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO TALK WITH THE COMMUNISTS AND MIGHT HAVE BEEN WILLING TO FIGHT ANOTHER TEN YEARS. THEY MAINTAINED THAT EVERY PRISONER CAPTURED REDUCES THE U.S. WILL TO FIGHT.)

(4) "THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE HAS FOUND THROUGH SECRET TALKS THAT THE U.S.-PUPPET ATTITUDE IS SOFTER THAN BEFORE. IF COSVN OBJECTIVES ARE FULLFILLED - THERE ARE CONCENTRATED ATTACKS ON THE PUPPET PACIFICATION PROGRAM, THE LIBERATED AREAS ARE EXPANDED, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE MEKONG DELTA, AND VC POLITICAL STRENGTH IS DEVELOPED IN PREPARATION FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT - THEN VC/NVA UNITS AND CADRES WILL HAVE ASSISTED IN FORCING CONCESSIONS AT THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS; IF CADRES AND UNITS PROCRASTINATE IN THEIR PURSUIT OF COSVN OBJECTIVES, THEN NEGOTIATIONS WILL FALTER." [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE COSVN REPRESENTATIVES TOLD THOSE 25X1 ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE THAT THEY MUST HAVE FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE JUDGMENTS, AND THAT THEY COULD DO

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NOTHING ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS DESPITE THEIR CONCERNS. ~~INSTEAD~~, THEY WERE ORDERED TO DEVELOP A LARGE NUMBER OF INFRASTRUCTURE CADRES AND OBTAIN PLACES FOR THEM TO SETTLE, SO THAT WHEN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OCCURS, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT COMMITTEES WILL BE ABLE TO SEND OUT HUNDREDS OF CADRES WHO REPRESENT VC BELIEFS TO DEVELOP, LEAD, AND CONTROL LOCAL POLITICAL BASES.)

B. "KEY MILITARY MISSIONS FOR SEPTEMBER IN PREPARATION FOR THE OCTOBER HIGHPOINT - IN GENERAL, CADRES AND TROOPS MUST BE MOTIVATED TO FULFILL LOCAL ASPECTS OF THE COSVN SPRING-SUMMER 1972 PLAN. ALL ASPECTS OF THE SECOND OFFENSIVE PHASE ARE LAGGING. THE THREE PUNCHES (MILITARY ATTACK, POLITICAL STRUGGLE, AND COUNTERPACIFICATION) MUST BE COORDINATED AND DELIVERED WITH EQUAL FORCE. THE THREE PRONGS (MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND TROOP PROSELYTING) MUST BE COORDINATED CLOSELY TO HIT THE ENEMIES CONTINUALLY TO PREVENT THEM FROM RECOVERING THEIR STRENGTH. AT THE SAME TIME, URGENT AND COMPLETE PREPARATIONS FOR THE OCTOBER 1972 HIGHPOINT MUST BE MADE AT EVERY LEVEL AND BY EVERY INDIVIDUAL.

(1) "SPECIFIC MILITARY TASKS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN SEPTEMBER BY COSVN MAIN FORCES INCLUDE MAKING FULL USE OF ALL ARTILLERY AND SAPPER ARMS TO ATTACK THE SAIGON CAPITAL ZONE

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DEFENSE LINE, DISTRICT SEATS IN SELECT AND DIVERSE LOCALES, AND MAJOR U.S. AND GVN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. ARTILLERY AND SAPPER INTENTIONS SHOULD BE TO INFLICT HEAVY LOSSES ON ENEMY FORCES AND TO DISPERSE ENEMY DIVISION UNITS IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AT A NUMBER OF LOCALES. AT THE SAME TIME MAIN FORCES WILL DEPLOY NECESSARY UNITS TO SAFEGUARD LIBERATED AREAS FROM ENEMY COUNTER-ATTACKS AND WILL MAKE COMPLETE COMBAT PREPARATIONS FOR THE OCTOBER HIGHPOINT.

(2) "LOCAL FORCES MUST LAUNCH COUNTER-PACIFICATION ATTACKS IN HAMLETS AND VILLAGES, DEVELOP GUERRILLA WARFARE TO CONTAIN ENEMY OUTPOSTS, AND EXPAND LIBERATED VILLAGES OR HAMLETS. THEY WILL PENETRATE STRATEGIC (GVN CONTROLLED, RURAL DEVELOPMENT) HAMLETS REPEATEDLY TO ELIMINATE ALL HAMLET TYRANTS, PARTICULARLY HAMLET CHIEFS, PACIFICATION CADRES, PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES (PSDF) TEAM AND INTER-TEAM LEADERS, PHUNG HOANG PERSONNEL, AND POLICEMEN. DO NOT LET LOCAL PUPPET OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO WORK AGAINST US. LOCAL FORCES MUST EFFECTIVELY USE SECRET GUERRILLAS TO UNDERMINE LOCAL GVN SECURITY UNITS SUCH AS PSDF PLATOONS AND ASSASSINATE LOCAL GVN AUTHORITIES.

(3) "PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS WILL ORGANIZE RECONNAISSANCE SAPPER TEAMS WHOSE MEMBERS ARE TO INFILTRATE INTO WEAK AREAS (WHERE GOVERNMENT SECURITY IS INADEQUATE OR WHICH ARE CONTESTED) TO ELIMINATE

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TYRANTS AT HIGHER LEVELS, ATTACK KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICES, RECONNOITER PROSPECTIVE BATTLEFIELD AREAS, AND HELP MAIN FORCE UNITS RECONNOITER TARGETS FOR THE OCTOBER 1972 HIGHPOINT.

C. "SPECIFIC POLITICAL AND PROSELYTING TASKS MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED IN SEPTEMBER TO PREPARE FOR THE OCTOBER HIGHPOINT AND PROVIDE A FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE POLITICAL ACTIVITY DURING A CEASE-FIRE PERIOD.

(1) "WE MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH AND INCREASE OUR IN-PLACE FORCES, PARTICULARLY SECRET SELF-DEFENSE MEMBERS, YOUTH GROUP MEMBERS, AND PARTY MEMBERS. WE MUST DEVELOP A STRONG STRUGGLE FORCE WHICH CAN LEAD THE POPULACE TO DEMAND PEACE, AN END TO THE WAR, AND BETTER LIVING CONDITIONS. WE MUST DEVELOP AGENTS (PARTY MEMBERS) FROM AMONG THE OPPRESSED, EXPLOITED, IMPOVERISHED ELEMENTS OF THE POPULACE AND MOTIVATE THESE PEOPLE TO JOIN THE REVOLUTION. THESE ARE THE PEOPLE WHO CAN GUIDE OUR TROOPS TO STRATEGIC HAMLETS AND IDENTIFY HAMLET OFFICIALS AND THEIR RESIDENCES. WE MUST PLACE OUR AGENTS IN LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEN USE THESE ORGANIZATIONS TO MOBILIZE THE POPULACE. BY CONTROLLING THE ORGANIZATION WE CAN MUSTER LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE TO DEMONSTRATE IN FAVOR OF OUR DEMANDS. WE MUST BE ABLE

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TO PENETRATE AND ASSUME SOME DEGREE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL PRIOR TO AND DURING THE CEASEFIRE PERIOD SO THAT WE CAN ORGANIZE STREET DEMONSTRATIONS WELCOMING PEACE AND DEMANDING THE DISSOLUTION OF THE PUPPETS' OPPRESSIVE MACHINERY AND THE UNMASKING OF THOSE WHO WERE TYRANTS DURING THE WAR. REMEMBER, THE FIRST STEP IN GAINING ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL MUST BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECRET DEFENSE CORE WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION WHICH CAN BE USED TO CONTROL AND/OR ELIMINATE OPPOSING FORCES. THESE PEOPLE

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CAN ALSO BE USED TO ELIMINATE A NUMBER OF LOCAL TYRANTS, SUCH AS HAMLET CHIEFS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, PSDF UNIT CHIEFS, AND POLICE INFORMANTS. ADDITIONALLY, WE MUST CONSTANTLY EMPHASIZE THE DEVELOPMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY PARTY MEMBERS IN PREPARATION FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WHEN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT COMES INTO BEING THESE PARTY MEMBERS MUST BE PRESENT EVERYWHERE. THEY MUST BE ABLE TO CONTROL ONE THIRD OF THE POPULATION IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES IF WE ARE TO DEFEAT THE ENEMIES BY POLITICAL MEANS. COSVN HAS ESTIMATED THAT NOW WE HAVE ONLY ONE PARTY MEMBER FOR EVERY 3,000 CIVILIANS."

COMMENT: THE BASIS FOR THE COSVN NUMERICAL ESTIMATE WAS NOT AMPLIFIED AND IT WAS NOT CLEAR IF THE FIGURE WAS FOR A SPECIFIC AREA OR AN OVERALL FIGURE.) "IF THIS RATIO REMAINS UNCHANGED, WE

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WILL BE UNABLE TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE
CEASEFIRE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION PERIOD. //

(2) "IN DEALING WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE, WARN THEM
TO REMAIN ON GUARD AGAINST ENEMY CONSCRIPTION SCHEMES. LEGAL
CADRES MUST CONTINUE TO MOTIVATE THE POPULACE WITH COUNTER-
CONSCRIPTION AND COUNTER-TAXATION THEMES. REMIND THE PEOPLE THAT
ALL SOCIAL STRATA, FROM WORKERS TO LANDLORDS, ARE BEING AFFECTED
BY TAXATION AND CONSCRIPTION. TELL THEM THAT MANY PEOPLE IN
BOTH THE CITIES AND COUNTRYSIDE WILL STARVE AS A RESULT OF
UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE RISING COST OF LIVING. IN SEPTEMBER, TWO
SPECIFIC POINTS MUST BE ACHIEVED IN CIVILIAN PROSELYTING. THE
FIRST IS TO MAKE THE POPULACE AWARE THAT THEIR PRESENT LIVING
CONDITIONS ARE THE RESULT OF CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE GVN AND THE
U.S. THEY MUST BE MADE TO REALIZE THAT THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT IS
SQUEEZING INCREASING AMOUNTS OF MONEY AND MANPOWER OUT OF THEM
TO SUPPORT THE VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR. IF THEY WANT PEACE AND
PROSPERITY, THEY MUST JOIN THE REVOLUTION AND RISE UP TO CREATE
A NEW ORDER. ONLY BY BECOMING REVOLUTIONARIES CAN THEY SAVE
THEMSELVES. EVERY PROBLEM THAT ARISES MUST BE DIRECTLY RELATED
TO FAULTS OF THE GVN AND THE U.S.; BY BLAMING THE ENEMIES FOR

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EVERYTHING, WE CAN EVENTUALLY CONDITION THE POPULACE TO COMPLAIN AGAINST AND THEN STRUGGLE WITH THE ENEMIES FOR BETTER LIVING CONDITIONS. THE SECOND CIVILIAN PROSELYTING POINT IS TO URGE THE POPULACE TO BREAK UP THE OPPRESSIVE GRIP OF THE PUPPETS BY MOVING TO THE COUNTRYSIDE. MOTIVATE THE POPULACE TO DEMAND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND OF RESIDENCE. ADVISE THEM TO DEMAND LAND TO FARM TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES, ADVISE THEM TO ABANDON THE STRATEGIC (GVN-SECURED, RURAL DEVELOPMENT) HAMLETS AND RETURN TO OLD HOMESITES. TELL THEM TO PLANT MANIOC, BEANS, POTATOES, AND SHORT-TIME RICE CROPS TO PREVENT FAMINE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. REMIND THEM NOT TO SELL ALL OF THEIR SURPLUS AT MARKET; INSTEAD, HAVE OUR LEGAL CADRES BUY FOODSTUFFS FROM THEM FOR EMERGENCY STOCKPILING."

2. [] DISSEM: EMBASSY USMACV USAID CORDS 7TH AIR FORCE NAVFORV 525TH MI GP 7602ND AIG OSI COMSEVENTHFLT CTF 77 AT SAIGON; SENT TO CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF [] 25X1

REPORT CLASS **S E C R E T** NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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